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INTRODUCTION
The boundaries between governmental power and personal right are
always subject to contest and violation. Few institutions are as crucial in
drawing these boundaries as § 1983 litigation' and related actions.2 These
f Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. The author's thanks go
to Tom Berg and Richard Delgado for their commentary.
1. Section 1983 refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), which provides that " [e]very person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
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causes of action are a significant element of the federal civil docket,3 and
are of great constitutional significance! Given the sheer number and im-
portance of these causes of action, one might well expect the law of § 1983
actions to by now display admirable rationality.5 As it turns out, however,
any such expectation would be unmet.
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... "
2. Much of the discussion below will be readily applicable to so-called Bivens actions
against federal defendants. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Similar qualified immunity issues arise under § 1983 and
under Bivens. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997) ("We have recog-
nized a qualified immunity defense for both federal officils sued under the implied cause of
action asserted in Bivens ... and state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (applying a
parallel qualified immunity test); Waddell v. Forney, 108 F.3d 889, 890 n.2 (8th Cir. 1997).
A similar legal standard is applied as well in cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 242. the
criminal law counterpart of civil § 1983 actions. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 281 (1997); Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 n.l (I Ith Cir. 1997) (" [Sluits
proceeding under both statutes make use of the exact same inquiry in order to determine
whether, in the light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of an official's action is appar-
ent").
3. It is difficult to pin down precise statistics regarding § 1983 actions filed or pending
in federal and state courts. See THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 180-83
(4th ed. 1996). Some sense of magnitude is suggested by vaguely relevant statistics. For
example, we are told that 37,723 statutory civil rights actions were filed or pending in the
United States district courts in 1995. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996
215 (1996) (table no. 342). Another count refers to 42,007 civil rights actions filed in the
district courts during 1996. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COuRTS: 1996 REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR, 139 (1997) (table no. C-2A). In the federal appellate courts, a recent year saw
2,948 civil rights employment cases and 3,820 non-employment civil rights cases in which
the United States was not a party. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: March 3 1,
1997 26 (1997) (table B-7). The United States was a defendant in 449 civil rights employ-
ment cases and 471 non-employment civil rights cases in the federal appellate courts in the
same year. Id. at 25. These figures may, of course, employ inconsistent definitions of civil
rights, and inevitably overstate and understate the numbers in different respects. Many civil
rights actions involve no § 1983 or related claim, no allegation of action under color of law
by any defendant, and no possible issue of qualified or civic immunity. See, e.g., McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) affid 528 F2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976) (alle-
gations of private employer racial discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act). On the other hand, § 1983 actions may be filed in the state as opposed to federal court
system. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
4. The quantitative significance of § 1983 and related actions has been regularly in-
creasing. See, e.g., supra note 3. The qualitative constitutional importance of these causes
of action is suggested at some length throughout.
5. Except where the context suggests otherwise, § 1983 actions will henceforth serve as
shorthand for any sort of civil rights action potentially raising issues of qualified and civic
immunity akin to those discussed below.
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Section 1983 qualified and civic immunities in particular involve re-
markable waste, inefficiency, pointless complexity, uncertainty, and unpre-
dictability. They result in consistent patterns of injustice to litigating par-
ties. Thus, crucial elements of § 1983 actions embody the vices of gross
inefficiency and systematic injustice.
No doubt some instances of these vices are, from the standpoint of the
judicial system itself, not vices at all. From that narrow, institutional
standpoint, a set of "rules" that allows relatively liberal courts to reach
correspondingly liberal results, and conservative courts to reach conserva-
tive results, may be quite stable. As we shall see, however, the "rules" of
qualified and civic immunity disserve justice and the public interest more
generally.
This article begins with a brief introduction of the idea of qualified
immunity in § 1983 actions and of the purposes of that immunity.' We
then explore some illustrative complexities and uncertainties posed by
qualified immunity. In particular, we will consider some questions of bur-
den of proof,7 appealability,' the role of balancing tests,9 the breadth or nar-
rowness of the rules of substantive law deemed relevant to qualified immu-
nity decisions, 0 the breadth or narrowness of the range of jurisdictional
sources of law deemed relevant to qualified immunity decisions, I the role
of time lags and other issues involved in a potential defendant's learning of
relevant rights,12 the'role of a defendant's understandable ignorance of the
law as an excuse, 3 and the common tendency for qualified immunity law
to actually retard the progress and development of underlying substantive
federal rights.'4 From there, we shall conclude by placing the reform of
qualified immunity law in the broader context of governmental liability.' 5
Ultimately, we shall argue, on grounds of efficiency and fairness, for
abolishing qualified immunity for individual government actor defendants.
At the same time, however, we shall argue for requiring all actions to be
brought not against individual government employees, but against the em-
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part V.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See discussion infra Part VI.
13. See discussion infra Part VI.
14. See discussion infra Part VII.
15. See discussion infra Conclusion.
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ploying government itself, on the basis of vicarious liability for employee
acts committed under color of state law. 6
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: SOME GENERAL TENSIONS
In general, qualified immunity shields individual governmental actors
from personal liability in § 1983 damages actions if certain criteria are met.
Such defendants will not be personally liable in damages if their conduct
did not violate relevant federal constitutional or statutory rights of the
plaintiff that were clearly established at the time of the defendant's act and
of which a reasonable person or a reasonable official would have known. 17
It is said that the inquiry is into the objective 8 legal reasonableness' 9 of the
defendant's action where that action is described with some degree of fact
specificity.20 Qualified immunity is said to protect mistaken but not plainly
incompetent judgments or knowing violations of the law.2' Thus, a right
may be clearly established and its violation may be apparent 2 even in the
absence of a precisely similar set of previously adjudicated case facts. 3
Several justifications have been offered for the availability of quali-
fied immunity. The Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he central pur-
pose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect
them 'from undue interference with their duties and from potentially dis-
abling threats of liability."'' 2 4 Qualified immunity thus recognizes a possi-
ble conflict between the public interest in active, vigorous law enforcement
and a governmental actor's personal incentives. Even if promised indem-
nity, a governmental actor may err on the side of caution and sheer passiv-
ity in carrying out the law. Governmental actors could be deterred from
proper law enforcement not only by fear of legal liability, but also by the
16. See discussion infra Conclusion.
17. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 304 (1996) (citing Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995); Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236, 243 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to "a reasonable offi-
cial"); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,640, 641(1987) ("reasonable officer").
18. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-20.
19. See. e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
20. See id. at 640-41; DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 803 (4th Cir. 1995).
21. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1986).
22. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41.
23. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985).
24. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806).
Other considerations, such as deterring able candidates from serving in public roles in the
first place, have also been mentioned. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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various costs of having to defend their conduct in lengthy litigation?'
Thus, qualified immunity, or at least the objective character of the test for
qualified immunity, is said to permit the prompt defeat of insubstantial or
baseless claims.26
Whether the current legal standard for qualified immunity actually
achieves these goals is, as we shall see, doubtful in the extreme. 7 Quali-
fied immunity law is in reality a general failure on its own terms. Even if
these goals were actually served by qualified immunity doctrine, however,
we could not then simply rest content. The Qualified immunity doctrine
involves very substantial costs. The Supreme Court has recognized that
qualified immunity must be traded off against the goals of "deterring pub-
lic officials' unlawful actions and compensating victims of such con-
duct."2 What the Court has not been willing to recognize is that these
costs -are large and do not fall randomly across the broad public. Qualified
immunity law has identifiable patterns bf distinctive victims. Those dis-
proportionately burdened by qualified immunity law tend to be those
groups and causes that are burdened and subordinated by the law more
generally. Qualified immunity law thus reinforces patterns of group subor-
dination and generally, though not invariably, operates to slow the rate of
social change.
This article will thus trace the failures of qualified immunity, both on
their own terms and with respect to broader issues of social justice. It is
possible for courts to respond to any such critique by claiming that they
lack the power to judicially change these patterns of immunity in meaning-
ful ways. Courts may claim to be helplessly bound by some clear congres-
sional intent regarding immunities, or by long-established common law
patterns of immunity.29 In reality, it is implausible for the courts at this
point to claim to be prisoners of clear congressional intent or of historical
25. See, e.g., Johnson, 515 U.S. at 312; Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232 (" One of the purposes
of immunity... is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted de-
mands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit."); Acierno v.
Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 608 (3d Cir. 1994) (en bane); Bartlett v. Fisher, 972 F.2d 911, 914
(8th Cir. 1992).
26. See Behrens, 519 U.S. at 305; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813, 819; GJR lnvs., Inc. v.
County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998) (referring to "the fear of con-
stant baseless litigation"); Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1532 (1lth Cir. 1996).
27. See discussion infra Parts II-VII.
28. Elder, 510 U.S. at515.
29. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 278 (1993) (quoting Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922-23 (1984)).
Syracuse Law Review
traditions of immunity3 0 And even if the courts consider themselves pow-
erless to change immunity law, Congress itself could easily expand and
contract the scope of immunities through statutory means.31
II. BURDENS OF PROOF AND APPEALABILITY: MODEST PRELIMINARY
COMPLICATIONS
In theory, the burdens of proof regarding qualified immunity are
straightforward and non-controversial. Here is a typical statement:
When a section 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity
on summary judgment, the plaintiff must show the law was clearly es-
tablished when the alleged violation occurred and must come forward
with sufficient facts to show the official violated that clearly established
law. The defendant bears the normal summary judgment burden of
showing no material facts that would defeat the qualified immunity de-
fense remain in dispute? 2
There is logic in requiring the plaintiff to offer some single published
case establishing the plaintiff's right, rather than requiring the defendant to
show that none of the thousands of potentially relevant cases actually does
establish the plaintiff's right. But let us begin with the humble problem of
the casual displacement of the burden of production. Consider, for exam-
ple, the perhaps entirely offhand declaration by a unanimous Eighth Circuit
panel that a defendant "is entitled to qualified immunity from [plaintiff's]
equal protection claim if [defendant] can prove that his 'conduct did not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known."' 33 This is a casual and perhaps even
unintended shift of a burden of production.
30. See for example, the thorough discussion in David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search For the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U.L.
ReV. 497, 499 (1992). See also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 409 (1997) (dis-
cussing current consensus on looking to both historical patterns of immunity law and public
policy concerns in determining congressional intent regarding § 1983 immunities); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,259 (1981) (same).
31. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543 (1984) ("It is for Congress, not this
Court, to determine whether and to what extent to abrogate the judiciary's common-law
immunity.").
32. Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1424 (10th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g.. Williamson
v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1261-62 (E.D. Va. 1992).
33. Hansen v. Rimel, 104 F.3d 189, 190 (8th Cir. 1997). The Hansen court quotes
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, but neither the actually quoted passage nor the rest of Harlow
support the apparent placement of the burden of proof in Hansen.
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Such casual displacements of burdens of proof may often be harmless,
but they can also introduce uncertainty and indeterminacy into the law of
qualified immunity. Additional uncertainties, not to mention additional
costs and delays, are then introduced by questions of the availability of in-
terlocutory appeals of qualified immunity determinations. It is occasion-
ally suggested that qualified immunity presents "a pure question of law," 3 4
and is therefore "always capable of decision at the summary judgment
stage."35
Legal reality, however, is hardly so simple. Courts recognize that a
defendant may be entitled to qualified immunity on the defendant's version
of the facts, but not on the plaintiffs version of the facts.3 6 Whether a de-
fendant violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights may turn upon a
disputed factual question of what the defendant actually did. For example,
the nature and degree of force actually applied by an arresting officer may
be in dispute. In this sort of case, discovery and perhaps credibility-based
findings of fact must be made before a defendant could be entitled to quali-
fied immunity,3" even if part of the reason for qualified immunity is to
protect defendants from the burdens of discovery 8
The courts thus must often allow discovery in order to determine
whether the defendant is entitled to benefit from an immunity doctrine the
purpose of which is largely to avoid discovery. In addition to this self-
undermining of qualified immunity, further complications concerning ap-
pealability arise. Some kinds of qualified immunity questions are appeal-
able on an interlocutory basis, but others are not. In particular, questions of
evidentiary sufficiency, or of what sorts of facts may be provable at trial,
are generally not subject to interlocutory appeal.39 On such issues, burden-
some discovery, again, may be required.40 On the other hand, interlocutory
review of qualified immunity claims raising only abstract questions of law
is generally available.4' Even assuming that the distinction between ques-
tions of evidentiary sufficiency and of abstract law cannot itself be liti-
gated, further complications and delays are raised by the possibility of suc-
34. See, e.g., DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 794 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
35. Id. at 794 (quoting Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307,313 (4th Cir. 1992)).
36. See, e.g., DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 795.
37. See id.; Oliveirav. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649 (2d Cir. 1994).
38. See DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 795; Johnson, 515 U.S. at 312; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525-
28.
39. See, e.g., Johnson, 515 U.S. at313.
40. See id. at 316; Knox v. Southwest Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Armendarizv. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane)).
41. See, e.g., Behrens, 516 U.S. at 307; Foy, 94 F.3d at 1531 n.3.
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cessive motions for summary judgment, on a qualified immunity theory,
based on the evolving state of the record in a given case.42
These complications and uncertainties, however, are modest by com-
parison with those involving pure questions of law. Pure questions of law
in the qualified immunity area are often more nearly pure in their uncer-
tainty, indeterminacy, and in their conscious or unconscious manipulability
than in any other respect. The various indeterminacies, any single one of
which by itself seems manageable, in combination leave remarkable room
for judicial bias and manipulation of qualified immunity law, and conse-
quently of the scope and protection of constitutional and statutory rights.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING TESTS: How MUCH LAW CAN BE
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED?
Over the last half-century, constitutional law has increasingly in-
volved one form of balancing test or another.43 Balancing tests leave ample
scope for legal indeterminacies. But we must not suppose that constitu-
tional tests that avoid, or appear to avoid, balancing must be more determi-
nate, clear, and predictable in their outcomes. For example, a shocks-the-
conscience test for substantive due process violations at least appears to
avoid balancing of interests, but is nonetheless indeterminate and subjec-
tive in application.
Balancing tests offer what might be called the clearest cases of lack of
clarity of the law. The opportunity for the exercise of judicial bias is evi-
dent. But even more important is the general and systematic bias of bal-
ancing tests against plaintiffs, given the nature of the test for qualified im-
munity. To the extent that the results of judicial balancing tests are
42. See, e.g., Knox, 124 F.3d at 1106 (citing Enlow v. Tishamingo County, 962 F.2d
501, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1992)); DiMeglio, 45 R3d at 795 ("After discovery and upon a proper
motion, the district court may reconsider the question of qualified immunity.").
43. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987) (referring to "a form of constitutional reasoning-balanc-
ing-that has become widespread, if not dominant, over the last four decades"). See also
Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REv. 261, 264 (1995) ("While the Supreme Court has adopted
the open-ended standard governing qualified immunity for public officials, it has also in-
creasingly articulated its substantive constitutional directives as balancing tests."); David L.
Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U.L.
REv. 641, 644 (1994) ("As currently practiced ... balancing is mired in a bog of indetermi-
nacy.").
44. See Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The dis-
trict court in this case adopted a shocks-the-conscience approach. After concluding that the
events did not make his conscience tingle, the judge entered judgment for [defendants].").
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difficult to predict, it is therefore difficult to say that the plaintiff's right
was clearly established at a specific level. This is all the defendant needs
for qualified immunity. The law is, in this respect, biased against the real
enforceability of even the most widely popular, uncontroversial general
constitutional rights. The law of qualified immunity is even more dramati-
cally biased against the real enforceability of emerging, newly recognized,
or controversial constitutional and other federal rights.
Consider, for example, the case of allegedly unconstitutional activity
engaged in by state officials investigating alleged child abuse. The under-
lying substantive law must in some way balance the rights and interests of
parents, the child, and of the public. Almost any sensitive balancing test,
however, will lead to specific results that are difficult to predict. If the
rights of the plaintiff must have been clearly established at a specific level
to defeat qualified immunity, the claim of qualified immunity will ordinar-
ily prevail in such cases, and the plaintiff's rights will therefore go unvindi-
cated.45
The more subject a right is to being balanced away under specific case
circumstances, the less likely such a right will have been clearly established
at a specific level by prior reported case law. One court has expressed the
problem in these terms:
The need to continually subject the assertion of this abstract substantive
due process right to a balancing test which weighs the interest of a par-
ent against the interests of the child and the state makes the qualified
immunity defense difficult to overcome. Moreover, the requirement that
the right be clearly established at the time of the alleged violation is par-
ticularly fonnidable. 6
This problem is hardly confined to the substantive due process con-
text. Determining whether probable cause exists to support an arrest, for
example, may involve a police officer's weighing particular factors in spe-
cific circumstances.47 This does not mean that arresting officers will al-
ways be able to invoke qualified immunity to shield their mistaken judg-
45. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41; Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1994); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1209 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
46. Manzano v. South Dakota Dep't of Soc, Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1995);
see also Callahan v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 880 F. Supp. 319, 329 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) ("[M]any courts have found that, in the context of child care workers investigat-
ing and bringing child abuse proceedings, there are no 'clearly established' substantive due
process rights held by parents."). The court in Manzano did not go so far as to endorse the
latter dictum in Callahan. See Manzano, 60 F.3d at 510.
47. Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805, 808 (Sth Cir. 1994).
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ments concerning the existence of probable cause4 But arresting officers
will generally be entitled to qualified immunity "if the arrest was objec-
tively reasonable-if a reasonable officer could have believed probable
cause existed for the arrest.",49
The law's emphasis on reasonableness tends to complicate the law-
suit, to emphasize the role of specific fact and circumstance and thus to
insulate defendants from liability. This is in part because two levels of rea-
sonableness can be distinguished in probable cause cases, and these two
levels of reasonableness operate jointly to insulate defendants. The pres-
ence or absence of probable cause, to begin with, is itself merely a re-
quirement ofreasonablejudgment ° The arresting officer need not assume
that the defendant will be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all the
charged elements.5 Probable cause is thus at some distance from actual
criminal convietability.52
The standard for qualified immunity in probable cause cases is then a
separate inquiry, and it introduces a further accommodation of the defen-
dant's conduct. In effect, the qualified immunity standard asks whether the
arresting officer's mistake in believing probable cause to be present was
itself, under the circumstances, a reasonable one. One might ask whether
the defendant reasonably acted unreasonably, but this would be unneces-
sarily paradoxical.53 The problem is not one of paradox. One can certainly
make a reasonable mistake or an unreasonable mistake about where a bor-
derline lies.
48. See, e.g., id. ("Based on all of the facts and circumstances within [the defendant's]
knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information at the time of the arrest,
a reasonable officer could not have believed probable cause existed for the arrest of [the
plaintiff]... ."). Note, incidentally, the further complication of including what a reasonable
officer should or would have known under the circumstances, beyond that which the officer
actually did know.
49. Id. (citing Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228-29):
50. See, e.g., Ripson, 21 F.3d at 808; Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228 (quoting Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
51. For discussion of this more rigorous criminal law standard, see, for example, Pat-
terson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,204 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
52. Compare the standards elaborated in the sources cited supra note 50 with those in
the sources cited supra note 51.
53. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643; Oliveira, 23 F.3d at 649 & n.2. Judge Jon 0.
Newman, who wrote the opinion in Oliveira, is also the author of the concise and stimulat-
ing article Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Rem-
edy For Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978). For a strong claim of para-
dox or contradiction in this context, see David Rudovsky, The Qualifled Immunity Doctrine
in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 23, 50-51 (1989).
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In this case, the reasonable mistake would be about where the border
lies between a reasonable, probable cause-based arrest and an unreasonable
arrest without probable cause. Police might, for example, have either rea-
sonably mistaken or unreasonably mistaken beliefs about the point at which
the reasonable speed of an accelerating car becomes unreasonable, given
the driving conditions. A judgment that the borderline speed is ninety
miles per hour would likely be an unreasonable mistake. A judgment that
the border between a reasonable and an unreasonable speed is forty-five
miles per hour could, on the other hand, often be deemed a reasonable
mistake.
Thus, the problem with applying qualified immunity standards to
probable cause determinations is not one of paradox, but of overprotective-
ness of many defendants and underprotectiveness of constitutional rights.
A similar effect is seen .commonly in cases involving government disci-
pline of employees based on employee speech. These sorts of cases are
known as Pickering balancing cases5 The underlying constitutional bal-
ancing test weighs the employee's and the public's interest in the em-
ployee's commenting on matters of genuine public concern against the
government employer's interest in workplace efficiency and morale."
Some courts have recognized the crucial effect that use of the Picker-
ing balancing test has on whether the employee's free speech rights can be
said to have been clearly and specifically established 6 Given the need to
weigh and balance, "the employer is entitled to immunity except in the ex-
traordinary case where Pickering balancing would lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the discharge of the employee was unlawful." 17
The Pickering standard may be verbally clear in some general sense,
but its application normally is so fact sensitive as to immunize the govern-
ment employer.52 Of course, in some cases, egregious facts, damaging em-
ployer admissions, or an unusually pro-employee or pro-speech court may
result in a finding that the outcome of the Pickering balancing should have
been clear to any reasonable employer 9 But such situations are not typi-
54. This term is derived from the case of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S.
563 (1968).
55. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Con-
nick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
56. Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179 (1 th Cir. 1997).
57. Id. at 1183 (per curiam) (quoting Dartland. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d
1321, 1323 ( llth Cir. 1989)).
58. See Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1213.
59. See Bartlett, 972 F.2d at 918 n.3; Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1213; Bennis v. Gable, 823
F.2d 723, 733 (3d Cir. 1987).
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cal. As has been suggested,, more commonly "the facts of the existing
caselaw must closely correspond to the contested action before the defen-
dant official is subject to liability."60 The failure of a defendant's qualified
immunity claim in this area is thus relatively rare.61
However, the complexity and sheer manipulability of the employee
speech cases is not always exhausted by the balancing test itself. Two brief
examples should suffice. First, it is commonly held that for the govern-
ment employee's speech even to qualify for the Pickering balancing test,
the speech must address some matter of public, as opposed to merely per-
sonal, interest.62 Some courts, however, have redescribed this test in order
to expand further the scope of qualified immunity and contract the enforce-
able scope of government employee speech rights.6' Such courts attach
little or no weight to the public interest or importance of the employee
speech.' Instead, they attempt to ask whether the government employee
was speaking in the capacity of citizen, or of government employee.65
However, this attempted distinction is often not merely difficult or
pointless, but wrongheaded. Speech of the greatest public importance may
deserve protection even though spoken only because of the speaker's
status, special knowledge, experiences, and insights obtained as a public
employee. Some public employees may even have a duty to report on such
matters.66 It is difficult to believe that we want to inhibit true and impor-
tant revelations, with little cost to the government workplace, merely be-
cause a court wishes to say that the speech was made in the role of a gov-
ernment employee and not as a citizen. Nor should we qualifiedly
immunize those with only modest grounds for disciplining government
employees.
The manipulability of the qualified immunity doctrine in employee
speech cases is displayed in a different way in Burnham v,. lanni, in which
60. Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1213.
61. See, e.g., Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 292, 293 (8th Cir. 1994); Bartlett, 972
F.2d at 916 (" [A]t least five circuits have concluded that, because Pickering's constitutional
rule turns upon a fact-intensive balancing test, it can rarely be considered 'clearly estab-
lished' for purposes of... qualified immunity .... ").
62. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Connick, 461 U.S. at 143, 147: Kincade v. Blue
Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1995). See also R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FuTURE OF
FREE SPEECH LAW ch. 7 (1990).
63. See, DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 805; Terrell v. Univ. of Texas Sys. Police, 792 F.2d
1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986).
64. See supra, note 63.
65. See DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 805; Terrell, 792 F.2d at 1362.
66. See, e.g., In re Linsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Doe v. Rains
County Ind. School Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1417 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the en banc Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a claim of qualified
immunity.67 In Burnham, the defendant, a state university chancellor, or-
dered the removal of certain photographs from a university departmental
display case. 8 The court concluded that even if the display case consti-
tuted a non-public forum, removing the photographs was unconstitutional
as a viewpoint-based restriction, since the chancellor was held to have or-
dered the removal based on his opposition to the views* expressed by the
photographs.69 Oddly, the court then went on to concede that the removal
was actually not viewpoint-based in this sense.7 The photographs, which
conveyed the interest of two history faculty members in military history,"essentially supported University operations and extolled the capabilities
and interests of certain faculty members." 71
Actually, the chancellor's motive seems to have been to avoid contro-
versy, possible disruption, campus fear and upset, and other possible reac-
tions by sundry other members of the university community2 Some or all
of those other members of the university community may have been moti-
vated in whole or in part by their own points of view regarding the photo-
graphs on display. But it is obvious--or at least reasonably arguable-that
this does not turn the chancellor's removal, for the sake of avoiding contro-
versy, into a viewpoint-based restriction. There was no indication that the
chancellor opposed any message conveyed by the display.73 As the court
recognized, a controversy or divisiveness-based rationale is in this sense
content-neutral and might also support the suppression of views critical of
those conveyed by the display.74 Whatever the best analysis or result
would have been in Burnham, it is difficult to see a restriction as view-
point-based where the reason for the restriction could just as easily encom-
pass any contrasting or conflicting message. To suppose that the court's
analysis, over the general dissent of two circuit judges, is so obvious as to
67. 119 F.3d 668, 668 (8th Cir. 1997) (en band).
68. See Burnham, 119 F.3d at 672.
69. Id. at 675-76.
70. See Id. at 678.
71. Id. at 678 n.18.
72. See id. at 676, 680.
73. See id. at 678 n.18.
74. Burnham, 119 F.3d at 679 ("Such a holding would presumably permit the suppres-
sion of... advocacy of gender and cultural diversity if [the chancellor] felt that such speech
contributed to an inefficient and negative working and learning environment on the campus.
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be clear in advance to the defendant is simply to further illustrate the ma-
nipulability of qualified immunity doctrine.' 5
IV. LEVEL OF GENERALITY PROBLEMS: THE COMMON UNDERCUTTING
OF RIGHTS ENFORCEABILITY AGAINST A BROADER BACKGROUND OF
MANIPULABILITY
As we have seen, a defendant forfeits qualified immunity if the right
violated was clearly established, at a fairly specific level, at the time of the
defendant's act.76 Inescapably, this standard provides room for more or
less arbitrary manipulation by courts, while jeopardizing practical enforce-
ability of basic federal rights. Much of the problem stems from the fact
that "[t]he operation of this standard .. depends substantially upon the
level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified." 77
It is all very well to suggest that the relevant right asserted by the
plaintiff must have previously been established at a fairly specific level. To
formulate the relevant right at a very general level would be to ask,
pointlessly, whether the defendant should have known that it was uncon-
stitutional to engage in a false arrest, or an unreasonable search or seizure,
or to inflict cruel and unusual punishment. Whatever the virtues of such an
approach, it is hardly compatible with qualified immunity.7  Officials
know that unreasonable searches are barred. What they may not know are
the boundary lines between reasonable and unreasonable searches in par-
ticular, concrete contexts.
So, if we are interested in critiquing qualified immunity doctrine, it
seems we ought to focus on specific rights and specific acts in specific
contexts.79 But this is not a mechanical, uncontroversial process. It is pos-
sible to misdescribe an action through too much specificity."0 Describing
75. Id. at 681 (McMillian, J. and Gibson, J, dissenting).
76. See supra note 20 and accompanyingtext.
77. DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 803; see also Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir.
1996) (referring to the level of generality problem).
78. See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 20. But compare Murphy v. State, 127 F.3d
750 (8th Cir. 1997), in which the court appears to have focused rather generally on whether
invidious racial discrimination by the state was clearly established as impermissible. See id
at 755. The court refers to "reasonably specific allegations" by the plaintiff, but does not
go on to discuss such allegations or consider whether those specifically alleged acts would
have violated clearly established law.
79. See, e.g., Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1209 ("'The test for immunity should be whether
the law was clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he
acted.").
80. See, e.g., Newell, 79 F.3d at 117 n3 ("The prison officials' definition of the right is
too narrow .... To accept their definition of the right at issue, 'would be to allow appel-
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an act of enslavement, for example, partly by reference to the names, ages,
or home towns of the parties may, for some purposes, be a worse rather
than a better, if more specific, description. Thus the law recognizes that
qualified immunity can be lost even where what the defendant specifically
did had not previously been declared illegal.8' As Chief Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has colorfully expressed the
point: "i]he police cannot obtain immunity for liability for false arrests by
arresting people on preposterous charges and then pointing to the absence
of any judicial decision that declares the statutory interpretation underlying
the charges to be preposterous. Their interpretation must be reasonable in
light of existing law.""2
Where generally relevant precedent is available, some courts haveCc requir[ed] some, but not precise factual correspondence with precedent,
and demand[ed] that officials apply general, well-developed legal princi-
ples." 83
These formulations allow some room for concern for enforcing basic
citizen rights at the expense of government actors, particularly for courts so
disposed.84 As well, these formulations enhance the legitimacy of the judi-
cial system by avoiding embarrassing results in extreme or in Chief Judge
Posner's terms, "preposterous cases." 5 A qualified. immunity rule that
immunized contemporary slaveholding government officials, on the theory
lants, and future defendants, to define away all potential claims."') (quoting Kelly v. Borg,
60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995)).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,._., 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1227 (1997)
(criminal civil rights case) C"[G]eneral statements of the law are not inherently incapable of
giving fair and clear warning, and in other circumstances a general constitutional rule al-
ready identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity.. . even though 'the
very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful."') (quoting Anderson, 483
U.S. at 640); id. at 1227 ("There has never been.., a section 1983 case accusing welfare
officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that if such a case arose,
the officials would be immune from... liability.") (quotations omitted); Harris v. Roderick,
126 F.3d 1189, 1203 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[The plaintiff] need not present a factually similarcase in order to show that his constitutional rights were clearly established."); Mendoza v.
Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1357 (9th Cir. 1994).
82, Northen v. City of Chicago, 126 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1997).
83. Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting J.H.H. v.
O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1989)); Waddell v. Forney, 108 F.3d 889, 894-95 (8th
Cir. 1997) (quoting J.H., 878 F.2d at 243).
84. For a case in which preexisting law not precisely on poiot was carried about as far
as one typically finds, see Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70, 73-74 (8th Cir. 1995). In Hayes, the
court simply concluded that prior rulings against requiring Muslim prisoners to eat pork or
pork-contaminated food also clearly forbade requiring Muslim prisoners to physically han-
dle such items, presumably with or without gloves. See Id. at 73-74.85. Northen, 126 F.3d at 1028.
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that no actual case precedent had put the officials on notice, would simply
be appalling. Such a rule would jeopardize the stability of the broader
qualified immunity rule in less extreme, more debatable contexts, and ulti-
mately would not serve the interests even of government officials.
Once the extreme cases are provided for, however, courts so inclined
can insist upon very specific prior case law guidance for the defendant. In
this mood, courts can begin by pointing to the Supreme Court's principle
that "the qualified immunity defense has evolved to provide 'ample pro-
tection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law."' 6 "Plain incompetence" suggests an ongoing basic unfitness,
beyond simply making a single constitutionally bad decision. And a
"knowing violation" standard aims only at sheer villainy, and even then
protects villainy where the law was hazy. After all, one cannot knowingly
violate a rule where the rule's applicability is unclear. One might even
hope that one's conduct in such a case would turn out to be illegal, but one
cannot knowingly violate a rule of unknowable applicability.
From there, it is a simple matter to marginalize the principle that offi-
cials must apply general, well-established legal principles even if a closely
corresponding case has not previously been reported. 7 Not all legal infer-
ences are clear, determinate, and uncontroversial. Given this indetermi-
nacy, "[i]t is not ... enough to demonstrate that the constitutional norm
relied on is the logical extension of principles and decisions already in the
books." 88 Rather, to lose qualified immunity requires that "preexisting law
must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a ques-
tion about), the conclusion for every like-situated reasonable government
agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circum-
stances." 8 9 This grants broad latitude to defendants.
For a sense of how this latitude can play out in practice, consider the
circumstances in Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education.9 Jenkins
involved an allegedly repeated strip search by school personnel of two
86. Acierno, 40 F.3d at 616 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).
87. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
88. Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotes
omitted) (quoting Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 1997)). But compare to
Hayes, 72 F.3d at 70, for a classic case of requiring an official to extend a prior rule inter-
estingly.
89. Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 823 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (1 Ith Cir. 1994) (en
banc)).
90. 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). For discussion, see Recent Case, 111
HARV. L. REv. 1341 (1998).
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eight year old second grade public school students.9 The object of the al-
leged strip searches was the sum of $7.00 allegedly stolen from a third stu-
dent's purse. 2 Despite initial unsuccessful searches in other places the
money was declared to have been placed, the alleged strip searches proved
fruitless. 3 The children's parents then sued for, among other causes of
action, § 1983 violations.94
Perhaps understandably, there was not much factually-similar re-
ported case law upon which to draw. The closest applicable case was actu-
ally deemed to be New Jersey v. T.L.0. T.L.O., however, involved the
search of a high school student's purse for cigarettes. 96 Even the most care-
ful balancing test drawn from the context of a search of a purse is unlikely
to address sensitively a first or second strip search of a young child. All
such a test could offer would be general guidance. The court in Jenkins
could have found the alleged circumstances of the strip searches suffi-
ciently egregious in themselves to have put the school officials adequately
on notice. Instead, the court focused on the differences in the case facts
between Jenkins and T.L.O. It concluded that "[p]ublic officials are not
obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing analogies from previ-
ously decided cases." 97 In particular, "school officials cannot be required
to construe general legal formulati6ns that have not once been applied to a
specific set of facts by any binding judicial authority.""
Thus, the en bane Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the en-
for .eigent of the students' privacy or reasonable search and seizure rights
under § 1983. Instead, the school official defendants received qualified
immunity based essentially on a legal indeterminacy theory 9 Qualified
immunity doctrine plainly draws much of its breadth and power from legal
91. 115 F.3d at 822-23.
92. Id. at 822.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 823.
95. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
96. See id. at 328; Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 823-24.
97. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 827 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Adams v. St. Lucie
County Sheriffs Dept., 962 F.2d 1563, 1575 (11th Cir. 1992) (Edmondson, J., dissenting),
dissent approved en banc, 998 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)); Jones v. City of
Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997).
98. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 827.
99. For merely a few citations from the extensive literature on the scope and implica-
tions Qf legal indeterminacy, see, for example, Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 283 (1989); Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, I LEGAL THEORY 481 (1995); Steven
L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1441 (1990).
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indeterminacy. To the extent that the law, including basic constitutional
rights claims, can be seen as indeterminate at the level of specific judicial
decisions, qualified immunity is strengthened and extended, and the en-
forcement of basic federal rights is undercut."°° Legal indeterminacy is
thus not a neutral phenomenon. As we shall see below, it feeds into the
qualified immunity issue to impede the development of the law and the en-
forcement of both controversial and uncontroversial substantive rights.
V. WHICH COURTS COUNT?: A FURTHER SOURCE OF ARBITRARINESS
The question of when the law on a particular point is clearly estab-
lished is itself unclear, in several respects. This lack of clarity about when
the law is clear in turn leaves qualified immunity law unclear, and opens
the door to arbitrariness in the enforcement of basic rights. The problem
can be introduced by asking whether all courts count in establishing the
relevant substantive law, and if not, how judges know which courts do
count. Depending on the answers, judges may then have to ask whether the
decisions of the relevant courts count equally or whether the relevant courts
have some hierarchy of influence in establishing substantive law.
This question was posed some time ago in the following terms:
"[S]hould our reference point be the opinions of the Supreme Court, the
Courts of Appeals, District Courts, the state courts, or all of the forego-
ing?" o Courts have diverged broadly on the range of the courts whose
decisions may be considered. 1 2 The Supreme Court has offered some lim-
ited guidance on the matter. In particular, the Court took up the problem in
a criminal law context in United States v. Lanier.10 3 Lanier establishes that
courts other than the Supreme Court can clearly establish the law."14 The
Lanier opinion seems well-disposed to according some weight, in appro-
priate cases, not only to the federal appellate court controlling the particular
jurisdiction in question, but to other federal appellate courts as well, and
even to other unspecified courts."' Lanier, however, does not speak with
great detail or decisiveness on these questions. 106
100. For distinct perspectives, see, for example, the sources cited supra note 99.
101. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
102. For a brief survey of several of the narrower and broader approaches, see William-
son, 786 F. Supp. at 1261-62.
103. 520 U.S. 259,259 (1997).
104. See id. at 1226 ("[Wle think it unsound to read Screws as reasoning that only this
Court's decisions could provide the required warning.").
105. See id. at 1226-27.
106. See id.
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Some courts have taken a relatively broad approach to the question of
which courts can establish the law for qualified immunity purposes. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has held that "in the absence
of binding precedent, a court should look at all available decisional law
including decisions of state courts, other circuits and district courts." 107
The Ninth Circuit has, however, added a further complication. The courts
may also factor in "a determination of the likelihood that the Supreme
Court or this circuit would have reached the same result as courts which
had previously considered the issue." 1 08
Let us pause to consider the consequences for the protection of basic
rights of a broad, inclusive approach to the question of which courts can
clearly establish those rights. It may be tempting for courts to assume that
the greater the number of courts that may be looked to, the greater the pro-
tection of basic rights. After all, the more courts that may be drawn upon,
the more likely a factually and legally similar prior case has arisen. Similar
prior cases, of course, are a primary way of clearly establishing th& law. 0 9
A larger number of prior cases, from a wider range of separate juris-
dictions, is, however, a mixed blessing for civil rights plaintiffs. All else
equal, the greater the number of cases already decided, the easier it will be
for the defendant to find a case arguably in conflict with any case cited by
the plaintiff, thereby perhaps undermining the clarity with which the plain-
tiff's legal principle is established. Suppose that the Ninth Circuit has
clearly held that a particular constitutional right exists. The plaintiff can
then hardly benefit from considering the other appellate circuits. Perhaps
another circuit has held contrary to the Ninth Circuit, or the results are
mixed, or most dramatically, the Ninth Circuit view turns out to be the dis-
tinct minority position. Can the Ninth Circuit then still say that the law is
clearly established, whatever other courts say? In this respect, broadening
the range of courts and jurisdictions considered undermines the protection
of basic rights.
107. Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotes omitted)
(quoting Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also
Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d
736, 739 (9th Cir. 1988). The Eighth Circuit adopted similai language in Burnham, 119
F.3d at 677 ("[I]n the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to all available
decisional law including decisions of state courts, other circuits and district courts... 2))
(quoting Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1993)).
108. Tribble, 860 F.2d at 324 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Capoeman v. Reed,
754 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th.Cir. 1985)).
109. See, e.g., Lanier, 520 U.S. at-, 117 S. Ct. at 1226-27.
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The Ninth Circuit's position is actually even less supportive of basic
rights claims than this language alone would suggest. Ninth Circuit courts
have, again, concluded that "[a]n additional factor that may be considered
is a determination of the likelihood that the Supreme Court or this circuit
would have reached the same result as courts which had previously consid-
ered the issue.""" Realistically, the likely overall effect of such consid-
eration would be to enhance the prospects for qualified immunity and un-
dercut rights enforcement. Let us briefly see why.
It is admittedly possible for a court to apply this factor in a rights-
promotive- way. A court wishing to determine whether a given right was
clearly established might, for example, find a single non-binding decision
on point, and in favor of the right. The court could then posit, with ringing
confidence, that the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court would assuredly
reach the same result, and conclude that the right is therefore clearly estab-
lished."' But even in this extreme case, much of the work is being done by
the apparent rightness of the single actual decision on point. Why not sim-
ply say that a decision so convincing that we may conclude that it would be
followed elsewhere is a decision that itself clearly establishes the law?
Perhaps this would assign too much weight to the decision by itself, and
not enough to its being followed elsewhere. But even if so, the risks to
rights enforcement of encouraging judicial speculation about Ninth Circuit
or Supreme Court holdings must also be considered.
Commonly, a judicially predicted, future Ninth Circuit decision may
only confirm the clearly established judgments of other courts. A judge
may thus simply predict that the Ninth Circuit would do what other courts
have already done. Or the Ninth Circuit, no less than any other circuit, may
disagree with or cast doubt upon law that is clearly established elsewhere.
The Ninth Circuit may simply weigh in on one side of a disputed question
of legal rights, as might any other circuit. The Ninth Circuit may often take
an expansive approach to basic federal rights. But in none of these in-
stances would ajudicially predicted Ninth Circuit opinion clearly establish
the plaintiff's right, thereby overcoming a claim of qualified immunity.
Neither, in any of these cases, would a real Ninth Circuit opinion. One cir-
cuit, for example, cannot clearly establish the law by disagreeing with less
rights-protective decisions from other circuits. One court's recognizing a
constitutional right may be a progressive step, while adding nothing to or
even reducing the clarity of the law in that respect. To recognize a right for
110. Tribble, 860 F.2d at 324 (quoting Capoeman. 754 F.2d at 1515).
111. See id.
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the first time may well be to add conflict and uncertainty to the overall state
of the law.
As well, let us bear in mind the possibility that a judge within the
Ninth Circuit might find only non-binding decisions on point, all upholding
the claimed right, but then find the right not clearly established, based on
the judge's guess that the Ninth Circuit, or the Supreme Court, would likely
hold to the contrary if given the opportunity. Referring to what the Ninth,
or any other, Circuit might hold thus may undercut the clarity of otherwise
established law. There is no rule that judges must guess that their own cir-
cuit would be more rights protective than other courts have been. And let
us not ignore the possibility that a judge may believe both that the Ninth
Circuit would uphold a given rights claim, but that the Supreme Court
would not, thus again upholding the defendant's qualified immunity claim
and undermining the enforceability of the right."' There is no rule that the
Supreme Court will be more rights protective than, say, the Ninth Circuit.
The courts vary in subtle ways as to the range of courts whose deci-
sions may be consulted in determining whether the law is clearly estab-
lished. Courts vary as to whether the decisions of some or all state
courts,13 federal district courts,' 14 or other federal courts of appeal" 5
112. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997) (reversing the en
bane Ninth Circuit on a substantive constitutional right to assisted suicide); see also Hunter,
502 U.S. at 224 (reversing Ninth Circuit on an issue of the scope of qualified immunity of
federal agents in a probable cause for arrest case).
113. See, e.g., Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1989) (appar-
ently providing for consideration of foreign state court and foreign federal district court
opinions, among others); Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring a
decision by "the highest state court in the state where the case arose, by a United States
Court of Appeals, or by the Supreme Court," thereby apparently excluding local state courts
of appeal and foreign state supreme and appellate courts along with federal district courts);
Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1514 (looking to "whatever decisional law is available," as opposed
to considering only the Supreme Court, "appropriate" federal circuit courts of appeal, and
"the highest state court") (citing, for the latter view, Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161
(4th Cir. 1980)); Ferguson v. Montgomery, 969 F. Supp. 674, 677 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (re-
quiring recourse to only the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals).
114. See, e.g., Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1389 (referring to "binding authority" as at least
one means of clearly establishing a right, which might presumably include local federal
district courts); Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1293 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Ordinarily, when
looking to see if a clearly established right exists, we look to the decisions of the Supreme
Court, of this circuit, and of courts within our circuit for guidance," thus holding open the
possibility of recourse to local and perhaps non-binding federal district court opinions.);
Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1118 (3d Cir. 1990) (" [L]one district court case from
another jurisdiction" as insufficient to clearly establish the law at least in the given con-
text.).
115. See, e.g., Foote, 118 F.3d at 1424 (allowing recourse to "the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts"); Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 827 n.4 (requiring a local
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should be considered. Nor is the law clear on such basic matters as
whether a split in the federal circuit courts necessarily means that the law is
not clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. On the one hand,
such a circuit split seems the central case of lack of clarity in the law.116
But some judges may not want to admit that all such splits render the rele-
vant law unclear, thereby automatically triggering qualified immunity na-
tionwide. If any circuit split always renders the law unclear for qualified
immunity purposes, then any single circuit can unilaterally veto, for all cir-
cuits, the enforcement of a given right, however otherwise widely recog-
nized that right may be. Such a right would not be enforceable anywhere,
as against a qualified immunity defense, until the Supreme Court itself ad-
dressed the issue.
This problem of a unilateral, nation-wide veto held by the least rights-
protective court in any given context was briefly referred to in the Tenth
Circuit case of Garcia v. Miera.'1 Remarkably, the court determined that
a conflict between federal circuits on some claim of right was admittedly
relevant to the qualified immunity issue, but not by itself controlling."'
Crucially, the court recognized that a circuit split is not, in the qualified
immunity context, a matter of neutrality or compromise; the split tends to
dictate universal non-enforceability of the right in question."1 9 The ability
of the least rights-protective court to universalize qualified immunity by
undercutting the clear establishment of a right might even extend to the
federal district court level as well. 20
Eleventh Circuit case as opposed to decisions of other federal courts of appeal); Warner v.
Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Medina v. City and County of
Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992); D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 881
n.6 (I1th Cir. 1995) (citing Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1498 n.32 (11th Cir.
1991)); Wallace, 626 F.2d at 1161 (referring to "the appropriate United States Court of
Appeals," as opposed, presumably, to other federal circuits); Wright v. Butts, 953 F. Supp.
1352, 1359 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (referring in particular to the Eleventh Circuit). It may be
more understandable for circuits with relatively few constitutional and other federal rights
cases to include other circuits as possible sources of law, as opposed to circuits with a
greater number of such cases.
116. Note, for example, the Supreme Court's distinct inclination to seek to resolve such
conflicts. See ROBERT L. STERN, Er AL., SuPREME COuRT PRACTics § 4.4, at 197-98 (6th ed.
1986).
117. 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 658 n.1 1 (quoting People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (9th. Cir. 1984)). Actually, it is imaginable that state law and
state court decisions could further undermine the clarity of the law. See Africa v. City of
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Ultimately, the most candid response to this veto problem is not to
pretend that the law is clearly established even where there is an ongoing
division in the federal circuits. Instead, as we shall conclude below,12 1 the
better solution would be to more dramatically rethink the broader law of
qualified immunity and of public civil rights liability in general.
VI. HOW QUICKLY MUST NEW LAW BE LEARNED?: PRACTICAL
LIMITATIONS AS LIMITS ON THE ENFORCEABILITY OF BASIC FEDERAL
'RIGHTS
Let us simply assume that all of the problems noted above have been
somehow resolved, and that the relevant law has just been specifically and
authoritatively determined by a particular court. In some abstract, technical
sense, the law is now clear. But is it realistic and fair to charge all govern-
mental actors with instantaneous, clear knowledge and understanding of the
import of that decision? Is it realistic and fair, for example, to require third
grade public school teachers to learn of relevant court of appeals decisions
on search and seizure law as quickly as state attorneys general? 2  As a
matter of fairness and realism, don't at least some government actor defen-
dants deserve some "lag time" to inform themselves of relevant legal deci-
sions by various courts?
Fairness and realism indeed have much to recommend them. Let us
remember, however, that in this context, fairness and realism for the gov-
ernmental actor defendant may mean that a violation of a plaintiff's vital
constitutional rights may go without meaningful remedy. Let us remember
as well that the legal system sometimes finds realism and fairness to be
outweighed, as in some of the cases in which a criminal defendant's igno-
rance of the law is held to be no excuse.' 3 Thus, in the context of qualified
Philadelphia, 49 F.3d 945, 970 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[S]tate law could help define the scope of
federal law.Y).
121. See discussion ihfra Conclusion.
122. For the relevance of search and seizure law to the work of third grade public
school teachers, see generally Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 821.
123. For discussion, see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3 (1994) ("If the
ancient maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' has any residual validity, it indicates
that. .. ordinary. .. mens rea ... does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong,
or blameworthy.") Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 517 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the
above principle, however, "presupposes a penal statute that puts citizens on notice of what
is illegal"); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 441 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("It
is the conventional position that ignorance of the existence, meaning or application of the
law determining the elements of an offense is not an element of that offense... ."); Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 129 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (" LS]tate officials know
or should know when they pass the limits of their authority, so far at any rate that their ac-
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immunity claims, courts must determine not only what fairness and realism
as to learning new law require, but what weight, if any, to assign to fairness
and realism regarding various sorts of government officials. All of this is
undertaken in the name of fairness, but these inquiries might undermine
any predictability of qualified immunity, further impede the prompt resolu-
tion of the civil rights suit, and in some cases defeat the plaintiff's claim by
extending, however unpredictably, the defendant's qualified immunity.
Thus, some courts may begin with the broad assurance that
"[g]overnment officials are charged with knowledge of constitutional de-
velopments, including all available decisional law." 12 Courts may then,
however, choose a more realistic path. Courts may distinguish between
government officials based on their better'25 and worse'2 6 practical access
t6 legal information, if not their different degrees of personal legal knowl-
edge and training.127 The path of realism leads to consideration, as well, of
the nature and status of the court issuing the new law, 121 that court's geo-
graphical proximity to the defendant government official, 129 the frequency
of the sort of litigation at issue 130 generally or for persons doing the defen-
dant's job, the kinds of sources of'' the legal decision and the length of
tion exceeds honest error of judgement and amounts to abuse of their office .... ); Bruce
R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1392 (1986)
(arguing that "due process requires a mistake of law defense for laws that criminalize ordi-
nary behavior"); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse: But Only for the Vir-
tuous, 96 MicH. L. REv. 127, 129 (1997) ("Malum prohibitum crimes are the ones most
likely to be interpreted as permitting mistake of law defenses."). Of course both the cate-
gory of"malum prohibitum" crimes and of "ordinary behavior," as referred to above. are
themselves vague enough to introduce additional uncertainty into the law.
124. Tribble, 860 F.2d at 324 (citing Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031,
1048 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Waddell, 108 F.3d at 893.
125. See Burnham, 119 F.3d at 677 n.17 (comparing the degrees of access to legal
advice of a university's history department and the school's chancellor, in the qualified im-
munity-context).
126. See Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting social worker
defendants in particular are usually not lawyers, and do not have "familiarity with the con-
tents of the Federal Reporter," and therefore require time to learn of and adjust to new case
law).
127. See id. at 305; Burnham, 119 F.3d at 677 n.1 17. See also Kit Kinports, Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 622
(1989) (discussing several relevant circumstances).
128. See Johnson-El, 878 F.2d at 1049; Williamson, 786 F. Supp. at 1262.
129. See Johnson-El, 878 F.2d at 1049; Williamson, 786 F. Supp. at 1262.
130. See Johnson-El, 878 F.2d at 1049; Williamson, 786 F. Supp. at 1262.
131. See Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657 n.10 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Defendants' as-
sertion that the law library of the New Mexico Supreme Court received the bound volume
691 of the Federal Reporter 2d in May 1983 itself implies that advance sheets were received
several months earlier. The publication of advance sheets, as well as the availability of the
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time132 the legal decision has been available, and the common-sensical or
difficult nature of the legal issues involved.' 3 Unfortunately, from the
standpoint of both the plaintiff and the defendant, much of this "realistic"
inquiry must be fact specific and fact intensive, with discovery and testi-
mony being clearly required.
In these kinds of cases, the temptation to assess the defendant's legal
knowledge by referring to what is deemed fair at various times, 34 or rea-
sonable, 35 or commonsensical 36 is obviously powerful. This broad-based,
multi-faceted, inescapably subjective inquiry, however, disserves the inter-
ests of both defendants and plaintiffs in crucial respects. The defendant in
such cases can hardly predict, once the lawsuit is filed, whether qualified
immunity will in this respect be recognized, thus complicating and extend-
ing the litigation or settlement process. And the plaintiff may be denied
recovery, on grounds of qualified immunity, even in cases in which the
decision much earlier by way of various legal and professional reporting services available
to school officials and their legal advisors, were sufficient to give defendants notice.").
Another query is whether Internet or other computerized database availability should be
deemed to further speed up the process, at least in some cases. See also Robinson, 840 F.2d
at 350 n.2. (average police officer might be apprised of a decision if "news was widely
published in newspapers or broadcast in other media").
132. See Garcia, 817 F.2d at 657 n.10; Schlothauer v. Robinson, 757 F.2d 196, 197
(8th Cir. 1985) (recognizing Eighth Circuit decision eleven days prior as not clearly estab-
lishing the law at the time of plaintiff's arrest); Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 972 (4th
Cir. 1984) ("Certiorari had been grnted... almost a year before final decision at the Su-
preme Court level. Twelve days may well turn out to have been sufficient time for someone
with a direct interest to have learned of, read and digested the... holding."); Williams v.
Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing "reasonable prison official" not
bound to have known of two month old New York state court ruling pending its appeal to
the Appellate Division); Doby v. Hickerson, 120 F.3d 111, 114 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining-
that the crucial point was not actual release of Supreme Court opinion, but its realistic avail-
ability to the defendant within some days thereafter); Robinson, 840 F.2d at 350 (recogniz-
ing that a police officer is not bound to know of Supreme Court decisions four days after
release, but law clearly established on other grounds); Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308,
1310, 1312-13 (6th Cir. 1997) (relying at least in part on a number of post-incident or unre-
ported decisions in finding excessive force law clearly established at the time). See also
Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1995).
133. See Johnson-El, 878 F.2d at 1049 (noting prison condition litigation as typically
presenting recurring issues readily grasped by non-lawyers). -
134. See Lintz, 25 F.3d at 306. In this respect and by way of further complication,
courts have held that later, post-incident judicial decisions can work backward in time to
help determine what law was clearly established at the time of the incident. See Parrish v.
Mallinger, 133 F.3d 612, 616 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Offet v. Solem, 936 F.2d 363, 367 (8th
Cir. 1991)).
135. See Lintz, 25 F.3d at 306.
136. See Williamson, 786 F. Supp. at 1262.
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relevant courts had indeed recognized the relevant right as of the actual
time of the defendant's act.
VII. GRANTS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS HINDERING THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SUBSTANTIVE FEDERAL RIGHTS LAW
We have seen that in order to prevail against a government actor de-
fendant, a civil rights plaintiff must, in effect, show two things: a violation
of some otherwise enforceable federal right, and that the right in question
was clearly established at the time of the defendant's act.'37 A right that is
clearly established later, but not at the time of the defendant's act, will thus
not suffice. 38 One obvious and apparently uncontroversial way of decid-
ing many interesting civil rights cases is to take advantage of this distinc-
tion. The court, at the trial level or on appeal, may thus decide the case in
the following way: whether the plaintiff actually held, at the time of the
incident, some alleged federal right is a controversial, broad issue of sub-
stantive law that need not be reached. Instead, the case can be decided for
the defendant on the clearer and less controversial grounds that no such
right as the plaintiff claims was clearly established at the time of the defen-
dant's action.139 The latter grounds by itself is enough to establish quali-
fied immunity.
Such an approach thus sets aside the merits of the plaintiff's substan-
tive rights claim, holding instead that even if there is or was some validity
to the plaintiffs rights claim, no such right was clearly established at the
time.' This approach has not always been used or endorsed by the Su-
preme Court, 14' but it seems to have certain jurisprudential virtues. Fo-
137. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231-32.
138. See, e.g., Warner, 57 F.3d at 964 ("Without addressing the merits of the constitu-
tional issue, we hold that it was not clearly established on the date in question that a strip
search. . . was unconstitutional."); Spivey v. Elliott, 41 F.3d 1497, 1498-99 (1Ith Cir.
1995); Schlothauer, 757 F.2d at 197.
139. See, e.g., Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 824 n.2 ("Because we conclude that, on May 1,
1992, the law... was not clearly established ... we need not reach the question of whether
Jenkins' . . . Fourth Amendment rights were, in fact, violated."); Warner, 57 F.3d at 964;
DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 790; Spivey, 41 F.3d at 1498-99; Acierno, 40 F.3d at 606 n.7;
Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1213-14.
140. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987); Mitchell v. For-
syth, 472 U.S. 511, 535, 535 n.12 (1985).
141. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232-34 C" Siegert failed not only to allege the violation of
a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of Gilley's actions, but also to
establish the violation of any constitutional right at all."); Manzano, 60 F.3d at 510 n.2 (in-
terpreting Siegert, despite disagreement from other courts, to require that a court address the
question of the existence of the right first, before considering its clarity of establishment).
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cusing on the lack of clear establishment of the right, as opposed to decid-
ing on its bare existence or non-existence, has its attractions.
In particular, such an approach seems in the spirit of Justice Louis
Brandeis' principles articulated in his well-known Ashwander concur-
rence. 42 Brandeis sought to discourage resolving constitutional issues
where such a resolution is unnecessary to decide the case, and also to dis-
courage unnecessarily broad constitutional holdings.'43 In some measure,
these principles are a matter of avoiding, or at least postponing, controver-
sial constitutional decisions. 14
Typically, holding that an alleged constitutional right was not clearly
established as of any earlier date, if it exists at all, will seem narrower and
less controversial than declaring that such a right did in actuality exist at
that time and that the defendant violated that right, but that the defense of
qualified immunity should nonetheless prevail, as the right was not at that
time clearly established. Certainly, it will often be less burdensome, costly,
and time-consuming for courts to decide merely the former, as opposed to
the latter. 45
Can we say, though, that avoiding a determination that the alleged
right did or did not exist at the time is a politically neutral principle?
Plainly not. This approach does allow courts to avoid a holding that an
alleged right does not exist. Anyone promoting a particular alleged right is
admittedly better off with a holding that the right was at best not clearly
established, as opposed to simply non-existent. And it is minimally possi-
ble that a court might refuse to recognize a constitutional right because of
the judge's sense that current, as opposed to future, defendants should not
For an expression of concern that qualified immunity law may pose "the distinct danger of
redefining substantive constitutional law," see David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity
Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23, 27 (1989).
142. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-49 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
143. See id. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring). For discussion, see Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994). See also Lisa A. Klop-
penberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts:. -The Supreme Court's Construction of
Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 1 (1996); Brian C. Murchi-
son, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation
of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 85 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
SUP. Cr. REV. 71 (1995).
144. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ("Constitutional adjudications are apt by exposing differences to ex-
acerbate them.").
145. See DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 798.
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be held liable for the violation of that right. But plaintiffs cannot be afraid
to risk early rejection on the merits, and therefore cannot typically favor an
Ashwander-type rule that reduces the likelihood of both highly disfavored
outcomes and a favored outcome in the form of a holding that the right ac-
tually existed, whether clearly or not. Plaintiffs seeking recognition of a
relatively unfamiliar right would presumably not typically bring the case
without some realistic prospect of success, or at least a sense that initial
defeats on the merits need not be final. Those promoting such a right
should, as plaintiffs, normally prefer a decision that reaches the merits of
the right claim itself.
Advocates for unfamiliar rights should therefore recognize that hold-
ing that a right was not clearly established-which is, certainly, to be ex-
pected-may prevent the court from issuing the much more favorable rul-
ing that there was, or at least is now, just such a right, but that the right was
not clearly established at the time of the defendant's act. Those pursuing
non-traditional rights claims can live with such a ruling.'46 After all, if
several courts issue the same ruling-that the right really exists, but was
not clearly established at the time of the defendant's act-the sting of such
a holding is eventually self-limiting. With enough such decisions, over
time, it becomes easier to argue that the right is by now in fact well-
recognized.
The current Ashwander-inspired approach has, more particularly, a
built-in, almost definitional, class bias. If we assume that different groups
hold different degrees of political and legal power, it will not surprise us
that the rights of special concern to the relatively powerful will ordinarily
be established earlier and more clearly than those of less powerful, and in-
deed outcast groups. To be powerful is to be able to protect one's legal
interests.
Of course, there is a sense in which the legal rights even of outcasts
are established early and clearly. It is in this sense that it is in a master's
interests that the quite limited legal rights of the slave be well-established.
But it is likely that potential rights of greatest interest to outcast groups will
not be recognized at all, let alone clearly established, at the same time as
the rights of greatest interest to more privileged groups. Thus, for example,
the voting rights of all competent adult Americans were not recognized at
146. It may be said that if a court determines that a right exists, but that its existence
was not clearly established at the time, only the second part of the determination is the
holding, and the first part, on the existence of the right, becomes dictum. If so, it is still true
that favorable dicta can, at this stage, be valuable in extending federal rights, and that re-
peated favorable dicta can be even more so.
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the same time,'47 and various potential rights of practical interest to the
least well off, such as to subsistence, housing, education, or medical care,
are still not established at the constitutional level. 4 ' At the very least, we
would expect the due process rights of welfare recipients to be clearly es-
tablished long after those traditional property holders. 49
The practical implications are obvious. Rights that are not yet clearly
established tend to be those of the least well off. And it is precisely those
sorts of rights the violation of which is excused by the doctrine of qualified
immunity.
CONCLUSION: ABOLISHING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND PERSONAL
LIABILIiY IN FAVOR OF CONTROLLED VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
The unnecessary complications, costs and delays, indeferminacies and
injustices of qualified immunity doctrine could be multiplied at any length.
At some point, one must consider reasonable alternatives to the reign of
qualified immunity. Certainly one attractive alternative would be to ex-
pand, in some fashion, the role of cities and counties and other govern-
mental units as civil rights defendants. After all, such entities are not enti-
tled to assert a qualified immunity defense on their own behalf under
current law. 50  And the underlying individual actor is not only an em-
ployee, but an employee whose action was undertaken under color of state
law.' Why not then abolish not just qualified immunity, but all civil
rights suits against individual employee actors in their personal capacity,
with the suit being brought instead against the employing municipality? 52
147. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § I ("race, color, or previous condition of
servitude") & amend. XIX ("on account of sex").
148. See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DoEs THE LAW MORALLY BIND THE POOR? ch. I (New
York University Press 1996).
149. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (recognizing a protectable property
interest in the continued receipt of statutory welfare benefits according to specified eligibil-
ity criteria).
150. See Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980); Africa, 49 F.3d at 975
(Scirica, J., concurring and dissenting); Brown, 922 F.2d at 1105.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Soc.
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Screws, 325 U.S. at 91 (discussing the criminal civil rights stat-
ute context).
152. It is certainly possible for private parties not employed by any municipality to act
under color of state law and violate § 1983. See, e.g., Kadivar v. Stone, 804 F.2d 635 (1 1th
Cir. 1986). But such private parties may not be able to assert a qualified immunity defense
even under current law. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 399 (1997) (recogniz-
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Rather than leave individual government employee defendants with
no qualified immunity defense, fairness suggests that the civil rights action
be brought not against the now defenseless individual employee, but
against the municipality served. A case on grounds of legal simplicity, re-
duced costs and delays, and fairness to all parties, including genuinely in-
jured plaintiffs previously denied full or any recovery, can easily be made.
Recovery against the municipality instead can be controlled in many ways
without reinstituting the inefficiencies and injustices of qualified immunity.
Losses can be appropriately spread without impairing the ability of munici-
palities to reasonably discipline and control employee conduct. If neces-
sary, damages recovery against municipalities could be capped or limited in
ways consistent with efficiency and fairness to all parties.
Such reforms would clearly require revision of the current law of mu-
nicipal liability. Such law is, however, currently neither so efficient nor so
patently just as to discourage revision. Legitimate municipal and public
interests can be accommodated under a rule in which municipalities, still
without qualified immunity, are generally available for suit as the exclusive
defendant.
Admittedly, the current scope of municipal liability is relatively nar-
row. In particular, cities and counties are not liable in § 1983 actions on a
vicarious liability'53 or respondeat superior theory.'54 Thus, it is said, a
municipality currently may not be sued solely because it employs a tortfea-
sor155 as opposed to a case in which some municipal policy or custom
caused the plaintiffs injury.156
Actually, some sort of line of causation can always be traced between
an injury committed under color of state law by a state employee acting
generally within the scope of assigned job responsibilities, and some gov-
ernmental policy, custom, or official decision. Clearly, the employee
would not or could not have committed the wrong under color of state law
without the governmental decision to hire the actor and assign particular
job responsibilities. The relevant issue could be formulated as one of de-
ing private prison guards are not entitled to claim qualified immunity, in light of purposes of
qualified immunity and lack of a sufficient historical tradition of such immunity).
153. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, _, 117 S. Ct.
1382, 1388 (1997); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122-23 (1992).
154. See Brown, 520 U.S. at___, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Collins, 503 U.S. at 122-23.
155. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at-, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92.
156. See Brown, 520 U.S. at , 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
385 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (1lth Cir.
1997), cert. denied, _ U.S.___, 11I8 S. Ct. 608 (1997).
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gree of causation. 157 But to ask about the degree or strength of the causa-
tion between the municipality and the plaintiff's injury is not a direct ap-
proach to the essence of the issue.158 The real issue is whether it is best to
impose a legal duty on the municipality in such cases,159 and this is ulti-
mately a matter of all the relevant policy considerations. 160
The policy considerations opposing expanded municipal liability in-
clude the fear of overcrowded federal dockets,' 61 the costs to municipal
treasuries, 162 and general concern over escalating and occasionally extreme
jury verdicts.'63 None of these considerations, however, undermines the
overall advantages of a ruleof municipal liability as opposed to individual
government actor liability. Damages in civil rights cases can be capped in
whatever way, or to whatever extent, one wishes, harshly or minimally.' 64
Cities might well be required to pay damages judgments that would other-
wise have been escaped, at least in part, by a city employee with limited
assets. 65
It is difficult to see the non-satisfaction of meritorious federal judg-
ments as particularly attractive. Admittedly, some employees are contrac-
tually indemnified by their employing government for their civil rights li-
ability. 66 But to the extent that individual government actors are currently
157. See, e.g., Pembaer v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477 (1986); Monell, 436 U.S. at
691.
158. See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Government Liability Under Section 1983: The Pres-
ent Is Prologue, 21 URB. LAW. 1, 4 (1989); Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under
Section 1983: Some Lessons From Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 1753,
1765 (1989).
159. See Schuck, supra note 158 at 1765.
160. See Hartley v. State, 698 P.2d 77, 83 (Wash. 1985) (en band); W. PAGE KEEToN
ST AL., PROssER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 274 (5th ed. 1984); Schuck,
supra note 158 at 1765.
161. See, eg., Susanah M. Mead, 42 US.C. Section 1983 Municipal Liability: The
MonellSketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REv. 517,540-541 (1987).
162. See id.; Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 489 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (referring to "the fiscal plight of municipal corporations today").
163. See Terrence S. Welch & Kent S. Hofmeister, Praprotnik Municipal Policy aid
Poliymakers: The Supreme Court's Constriction of Municipal Liability, 13 S. ILL. U.L.J.
857, 857 (1989).
164. See, e.g., the range of damages caps in Title VII actions, as specified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (1996). See also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 260
(1981) (recognizing that cities are immune from punitive damages liability).
165. See, e.g., Larry Kramer & Alan . Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section
1983: 1 Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 249,276-77 (1987).
166. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Riverside, 896 F.2d 398, 398 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
the indemnification of an employee by city even regarding punitive damages award); Jones
v. Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988); Kramer & Sykes, supra note 165 at 277 n.95;
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indemnified, this suggests that bringing the suit against the municipality
and not the employee will not have dramatic fiscal consequences for the
city.
Often, it may seem that the moral blame for a civil rights violation, if
any, attaches more to the individual employee than to the municipality.
Perhaps the city takes the law of unreasonable searches and seizures quite
seriously, and regularly instructs its police officers in such matters. If a
single police officer enters a gray area of the law, or perhaps even con-
sciously violates clearly established legal principles taught by the depart-
ment, is it fair and reasonable to allow the plaintiff to collect against the
city, as opposed to the individual officer?
Actually, we already have in place most of the grounds for an af-
firmative answer to this question. The unnecessary costs and complexities
of litigating qualified immunity issues are already borne not only by the
litigants, but by any municipality that contractually indemnifies its employ-
ees.'67 The cost, in the broadest sense, to plaintiffs of currently having no
practical recourse for many violations of important federal rights can
rightly be said to be enormous. This single striking fact should no longer
be minimized. Certainly, cities are in a better position to appropriately
spread the economic costs of their agents' actual violations, clear and un-
clear, of federal rights than are plaintiffs or individual government ac-
tors. 168
Let us bear in mind that some common civil rights violations, such as
those involving unreasonable searches and seizures, the use of excessive
force, and arrests without probable cause, are likely not class neutral in
their incidence. 69 Excessive force is not applied against a random sample
of the citizenry. Recovery against the city in such cases tends to redistrib-
ute costs from less well off victims of rights violations to the generally
better off beneficiaries 170 of city services in general. 171 This process should
be promoted.
see also David Rudovsky, supra note 1413 at 74 (noting the possibility of municipal indem-
nification of appropriate city employees).
167. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168. For discussion and further citations in the state tort law context, see for example,
Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Ark. 1968). See also Brinkman v. Indianapolis, 231
N.E.2d 169, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967).
169. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 165, at 279. Admittedly, some constitutional
torts such as violation of the free speech rights of government employees are not typically
visited upon the economically worst off.
170. See id. It is possible to argue that taxpayers generally do not benefit from the
rights violation itself, in the sense that the taxpayers would have been just as well off if the
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These considerations do not directly address the sense that as between
a single malicious government employee and an innocent government it-
self, blame should attach more to the former. This argument, however,
simply raises the issue of the fairness of general agency principles, includ-
ing that of respondeat superior, which we have long assumed to be well
justified in other contexts. 72 Let us remember that there can be no § 1983
violation without action under color of state law, 73 and that action under
color of state law implies state action,1 74 state causation, 175 and, crucially, a
finding of genuine state responsibility.176 Beyond some point, there is no
action under color of state law, and hence no possible action under § 1983
against any defendant.
If this case of a malicious employee and an innocent government re-
mains morally unsatisfying, we should remember as well that § 1983 ac-
tions need not be the only legal means of apportioning blame. An innocent
individual government actor had acted merely up to the border of the plaintiffs rights, and
not beyond. Even if so, this hardly seems the relevant inquiry. In tort negligence and
agency law, we may hold the employer or principal liable for acts within the scope of an
employee's responsibility, even where the tortiousness of the employee's act did not itself
actually benefit the employer, See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-231 (scope
of employment re tortious and criminal acts), § 243 (employee negligence), § 245 (use of
force by employee) (1958).
171. Larry Kramer and Alan 0. Sykes tentatively argue for both personal and munici-
pal immunity for "good faith" rights violations. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 165, at
301. Liability in such cases, whether in the form of nominal or realistic compensatory dam-
ages, should fall on the city even in such cases not out of a sense bf moral outrage, but be-
cause constitutional rights are genuine rights, the violation of which should not go unre-
dressed. It is up to the courts to decide what sort of state of mind is required as an element
of the underlying rights violation itself. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-
30 (1986) (ruling no intent requirement for § 1983 violation itself, apart from whatever level
of intent may be required to prove a violation of the underlying federal right itself). For an
early suggestion of broader civic liability, see Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers:
Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy For Law Enforcers' Misconduct,
87 YALE L.J. 447, 456 (1978) ("[Tjhe objectives of compensating the victim and deterring
misconduct would be met more frequently if the defendant were the wrongdoer's em-
ployer-either the appropriate unit of government or the governmental agency.").
172. See sources cited supra note 170.
173. See supra note 1.
174. See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928, 929 (ruling that an action under color of state
law is essentially the equivalent to a Fourteenth Amendment state action) (citing United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (holding misuse of state authority by an actor
clothed with the authority of the state is action under color of state law)).
175. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (requiring a causation element for the existence of
action under color of state law).
176. See id. at 935 n.18, (noting that state action, and thus action under color of state
law require a showing of at least partial state responsibility). For a broader discussion, see
R. George Wright, State Action As State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 685 (1990).
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city may, if we wish, be permitted to seek partial or complete indemnity
from a malicious employee.' 77 The employee in such indemnity cases can
be granted whatever defenses, if any, are deemed appropriate, including
qualified immunity. 178 The injustices and inefficiencies of qualified immu-
nity law in such indemnity cases would at least not be borne by the under-
lying rights victim. And of course, the incentives and rewards of poten-
tially malicious civic employees can also be adjusted by contract terms
regarding suspensions, demotions, and outright dismissal.
There is thus no reason to suppose that malicious individual govern-
ment employees would get off scot free or be legally undeterrable if § 1983
recovery were solely against the employing municipality. If for any reason
the judicial system insists on some sort of direct recovery against the mali-
cious employee by the underlying plaintiff, the state law of intentional torts
may instead be invoked, on whatever terms we wish. 179 Ultimately, the
best justified solution seems to involve abolishing individual government
employee liability along with qualified immunity, and allowing a much
expanded scope for plaintiff recovery against the employing governmental
unit.
177. For a discussion of background principles regarding an employee being required
to indemnify an employer, see 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.2, at
57-59 (2d ed. 1986) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2)(a) & cmt. e
(1979)).
178. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (allowing immunity "so long as
defendant acted in a reasonably objective manner").
179. Section 1983 actions themselves are often brought in conjunction with pendent
state tort law claims. See, e.g., Deakins v. Monahan, 484 U.S. 193, 193 (1988); Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 316 (1986); Riverside v. Rivera, 473 U.S. 1315, 1316 (1985); Lugar,
457 U.S. at 940; Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 252.
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